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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 890257-CA

v.
Category No. 2

JOANNE ODOM,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-302 (1978).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989),
as the appeal was transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme
Court on May 2, 1989.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the
following provisions:
1.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103 (1978),

2.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-202 (1978),

3.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301 (1978),

4.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978).

Copies of these provisions are contained in the Addendum.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the

jury's verdict convicting defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Joanne Odom, was charged with aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-6-302 (1978).
Defendant was convicted of Aggravated Robbery on April
27, 1988, following a jury trial, in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
John A. Rokich, Judge, presiding.

Defendant was sentenced by

Judge Rokich on September 23, 1988, to five years to life at the
Utah State Penitentiary.
An appeal was filed with the Utah Supreme Court.

On

May 2, 1989, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this
Court for disposition.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 4, 1988, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Paul
Kogen entered the Continental Bank and Trust Company located at
2100 East 7000 South in Salt Lake City (T. at 7-8, 22, 38). Just
prior to his entering the bank, Lisa Gitlan, a bank employee
operating the drive-up window, observed Kogen "walking along the
walk in front of the branch", then turn into the bank
(T. at 38, 45). Kogen was wearing a hooded royal blue jogging
outfit, ski goggles, a scarf over his nose and mouth, and white
gloves.

The hood was pulled over his head, and his hair was

tucked back in.

Kogen was also brandishing a small automatic
-2-

pistol, which was covered by a white cloth (T. at 8-9, 13, 17,
23-24, 38, 46, 57-59).
Upon entering the bank, Kogen first approached bank
teller Wendy Gren, and pointing the pistol directly at her,
exclaimed, "This is a bank robbery; give me your money"
(T. at 8, 18, 38). Gren complied, handing over numerous bills,
including her "bank money" and "red dye pack" (T. at 9-10).

The

dye pack is basically wrapped money, with bills on top and bottom
and in between a "red dye pack" that is automatically detonated
30-45 seconds after it is taken through the doors of the bank
(T. at 10, 14). The "bank money", also referred to as "bait
money", triggers a silent alarm and engages surveillance cameras
when removed from the till (T. at 10).
Kogen, with some difficulty, placed the money inside a
plastic grocery sack, then moved down to a second teller, Linda
Romrell, and made a similar demand (T. at 11, 19, 28, 39, 58).
After obtaining money from both tellers, Kogen exited the bank
(T. at 11, 29. 40, 58). The robbery took approximately two to
four minutes (T. at 12, 47).
Kogen "ran" to a four-door black Volvo parked
approximately twenty to thirty yards from the bank and entered
the passenger side (T. at 40-41, 49-50, 59). Driving the black
Volvo was defendant, Joanne Odom (T. at 120). Shortly after
pulling away from the bank, at a distance of approximately one
hundred yards, and directly in front of an Albertson's grocery
store, the "red-dye pack" exploded (T. at 41-43, 52).

-3-

Several witnesses inside the bank had watched Kogen
enter the black Volvo and the explosion shortly thereafter
(T. at 20-21, 32-34, 40-43-, 49, 59-60, 69-70).

Martin Curtis, a

bank customer, followed Kogen as he exited the bank, attempting
to obtain the license number of the black Volvo (T. at 66).
Curtis followed Kogen to a distance of approximately "20 feet
from where the car stalled" (T. at 66, 69). Curtis observed
Kogen raise the hood of the car, while defendant exited from "the
driver's side of the car, and . . . left the driver's door open
and got out and stood there and looked under the hood at him
[Kogen] trying to figure out what the problem was" (T. at 42-43,
59-60, 69). Upon starting the car, Kogen "slammed the hood down"
and "ran across the front of the car and jumped in the driver's
side and told her [defendant] to get in, and she ran across and
jumped in the passenger side, and then they left" (T. at 60-61).
Another witness, Dale Ambrose, a bag-boy for
Albertsons, observed the commotion from a short distance as he
was helping a customer with her groceries (T. at 75, 79).
Ambrose testified that both defendant and Kogen jumped from the
black Volvo and attempted to remove the "red-dye" dust (T. at 7576).

Defendant opened three of the doors and Kogen one (T. at

80).

Ambrose then heard Kogen say, "Hey, you - hurry.

Get in the car.
76).

Get in.

Hurry before witnesses see us" (T. at 62-63,

Kogen then entered the driver's side and defendant entered

the passenger side (T. at 70). As the car pulled away, a
temporary license plate sticker "flew" out the window (T. at 82).
Ambrose recovered the sticker, and turned it into police (T. at
76, 82, 84-85).
-4-

Police ran a trace of the license number on the sticker
which showed the car to be registered to Paul Kogen of 1445
Winterwood Circle in Sandy (T. at 85).

Police immediately went

to that address where they found and arrested both defendant and
Kogen.

Following their arrest, both defendant and Kogen were

taken back to the robbery scene and subsequently identified by
several witnesses (T. at 62, 85-86, 90, 99-100).

Defendant was

then taken to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice where she was
interviewed (T. at 86).
Prior to being interviewed, defendant was apprised of
her rights, after which she voluntarily agreed to talk
(T. at 91-92).

During a tape recorded interview with Deputy

Sheriff Manfred Lassig, of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office,
defendant gave the following account of events with regard to the
bank robbery (T. at 102). Defendant indicated that she was not
involved in the bank robbery and only became aware of it after it
had occurred (T. at 93). She said that she had been waiting in
front of the Albertson's store when Kogen drove up.

Kogen had

dropped her off a few minutes before and had indicated that he
was "going over to take a look at the bank" (T. at 95-96).

When

he returned and as she was about to enter the car, she noticed
some red dye in the vehicle (defendant denied being in the
vehicle when the "red-dye pack" exploded, T. at 103). After
noticing the red dye, defendant no longer wished to go with
Kogen, but only wanted to recover her purse and "stuff" inside
(T. at 93-94).

After a few moments, defendant entered the car

and the two drove to 1445 Winterwood Circle, stopping along the
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way at a 7-Eleven convenience store to purchase a drink (T. at
95).

Defendant further told police that she knew Kogen had been

involved in another robbery sometime prior to the robbery on
February 4, 1989 (T. at 95, 141). Following the interview,
defendant was charged with aggravated robbery (T. at 97).
At trial, defendant admitted lying to police during the
recorded interview given after she was arrested (T. at 131-132,
137-139).

Defendant testified that she had known Kogen for a

period of two years and had lived with him for approximately six
months at his home at 1445 Winterwood Circle in Sandy (T. at 117118).

She said that on February 4, 1988, she drove Kogen to the

Continental Bank and Trust, believing that he was going to cash a
check he had received from drug buyers.

When she dropped him off

"right in the front of the front doors" (T. at 120, 121, 145),
she did not notice him wearing or having in his possession the
ski goggles, scarf, gun, or plastic sack used during the robbery
(T. at 122, 139-140).

Defendant testified she left Kogen at the

bank and went to the Albertson's store nearby to purchase
cigarettes (T. at 120-121).

A few minutes later she returned to

the bank, observed Kogen "walking out" of the bank and entering
the car (T. at 121). Again, defendant indicated she did not
notice "anything unusual" (i.e. ski goggles) except that Kogen
was now carrying a plastic grocery sack containing money and a
gun (T. at 122). When Kogen entered the car he exclaimed, "Just
hurry and go, hurry and go," and, sometime thereafter, indicated
he had robbed the bank (T. at 123). Defendant complied with the
order to drive away and, moments later, "a bomb blew up" ("red-
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dye pack") (T. at 123). Defendant testified that "smoke started
coming out, and he [Kogen] was freaking out . . . .

He was

throwing things off his lap and throwing things off the back
seat" (T. at 123-124).

Defendant then stopped the car and

attempted to leave, but was forced by Kogen to get back in the
car and to lie down on the back seat (T. at 124). Kogen opened
the car doors to clear the red dye dust (T. at 124). He then
drove to a 7-Eleven where defendant purchased a drink.
neither fled nor attempted to phone police.

Defendant

Defendant and Kogen

then went to Kogen's residence at 1445 Winterwood Circle in Sandy
where they were arrested shortly thereafter (T. at 125-126).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence presented at trial and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom were sufficient to convict defendant
of aggravated robbery.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DEFENDANT
OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to
convict her of aggravated robbery.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated the
standard of review on appeal when the argument concerns
sufficiency of the evidence.
to the jury verdict.

The Court accords great deference

It is the exclusive function of the jury to

weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the
witnesses.

M

[T]he 'Court should only interfere when . . .

reasonable men could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a
-7-

reasonable doubt.'"

State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah

App. 1987) (quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah
1980)).

Furthermore, defendant has the burden of establishing

-that the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime."

State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d

1161, 1168 (Utah 1980); see also State v. Walker, 765 P.2d 874
(Utah 1988); State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1985);
State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981).
All of the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
from the evidence should be reviewed in the light most favorable
to the jury verdict.

When the evidence is so viewed, the Court

reverses only when the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt concerning defendant's guilt.

See State v.

Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); accord e.g., State v. Verde,
770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 593
(Utah 1988); State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231 (Utah 1987).

The

Court has succinctly stated that, unless there is a clear showing
of a lack of evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld.

See

Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412; State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 814
(Utah 1977).
The statutory requirements of robbery and aggravated
robbery, as provided by Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-301 and 76-6-302
(1978), are as follows:
76-6-301 Robbery.—(1) Robbery is the
unlawful and intentional taking of personal
property in the possession of another from
his person, or immediate presence, against
-8-

his will, accomplished by means of force or
fear.
76-6-302 Aggravated Robbery.—(1) A person
commits aggravated robbery if in the course
of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife, or
a deadly weapon;
In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1978) provides;
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who
directly commits the offense, who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall
be criminally liable as a party for such
conduct.
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]he standard for
determining whether an individual is an accomplice to a crime is
whether that individual could be charged with the same offense as
the defendant."

State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Utah 1985)

(footnote omitted); see also State v. Berg, 613 P.2d 1125, 1126
(Utah 1980); State v. Cornish, 560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Utah 1977).
In the present case the evidence conclusively
established, and defendant conceded, that she drove Kogen to the
bank where the aggravated robbery occurred, and drove and
accompanied Kogen as he fled therefrom.

The only issue raised by

§ 76-6-302 was recently amended, effective April 24, 1989,
and now provides in pertinent part:
Aggravated Robbery.—(1) A person commits
aggravated robbery if in the course of
committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses or threatens to use a deadly
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601;
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978) (Supp. 1989).
-9-

defendant on appeal is whether there exists sufficient evidence
to establish whether defendant had the requisite mental state for
the commission of the crime.
As indicated above, robbery requires an "intentional"
taking.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-103 (1978) provides in pertinent

part:
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when
it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.
•

• •

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800 (Utah
1979), stated:
Specific intent need not be proved by direct
evidence, and of course, is always subject to
denial by an accused. The fact finder,
however, is entitled to draw all reasonable
inferences from the facts and from the
actions of the defendant.
Id. at 802 (emphasis added); see also State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d
1071 (Utah 1989); State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985);
State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 1983); State v.
Peterson, 22 Utah 2d 377, 453 P.2d 696 (Utah 1969).2
In Peterson the Utah Supreme Court stated:
It is true that the State was unable to prove
directly what was in the defendant's mind
relative to doing harm to the victim; and
that he in fact denied any such intent.
However, his version does not establish the
fact, nor does it even necessarily raise
sufficient doubt to vitiate the conviction.
If it were so, it would lie within the power
of a defendant to defeat practically any
conviction which depended upon his state of
mind. As against what he says, it is the
jury's privilege to weigh and consider all of
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In the present case, defendant's requisite intent was
clearly established at trial through the evidence presented, and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, including the express
actions and conduct of defendant herself.
First, defendant testified that when she dropped off
Kogen "right in the front of the front doors of the bank," she
believed he was only going to cash a check, and she did not
notice him wearing or having in his possession the ski goggles,
scarf, gun or plastic sack used in the robbery (T. at 120-122,
139-140, 145). Defendant's claim would have to be considered
very questionable since bank teller Lisa Gitlan testified that
she observed Kogen wearing and/or having possession of these
items prior to entering the bank while he was "walking along the
walk in front of the branch" (T. at 38, 45). It could have been
only a matter of seconds between the time Kogen exited the car,
until he was initially observed by Gitlan.

This would tend to

show that Kogen was disguised with or had possession of the above
items at the time he left the car.

If Kogen was wearing or had

possession of the items used in the crime prior to exiting the
car, this may not only discredit the testimony of defendant, but
would also be strong evidence that she was aware of and aided
2
Cont. the other facts and circumstances
shown in evidence in determining what they
will believe. This includes not only what
was said and what was done, but also drawing
reasonable inferences from the conduct shown,
. . . . This is in accord with the
elementary rule that a person is presumed to
intend the natural and probable consequences
of his acts.
State v. Peterson, 453 P.2d at 697 (footnotes omitted).
-11-

Kogen in the commission of the crime.

In addition, relevant to

defendant's knowledge, the evidence showed that defendant knew
Kogen had committed a separate robbery prior to February 4, 1988
(T. at 95, 141) .
Second, defendant testified that after dropping
defendant off at the bank, she left and went to a nearby
Albertson's grocery store to purchase cigarettes (T. at 120,
121).

It would seem very illogical that Kogen, who was about to

commit a robbery, would do so without knowing whether his escape
car would be around when he left the bank.

This again would tend

to discredit defendant's testimony as to her involvement in the
crime.
Third, defendant testified that when she "returned" to
the bank a few minutes later, she observed defendant "walking
out" of the bank and did not notice "anything unusual" (i.e.
wearing disguise of ski goggles or scarf) except that Kogen was
now carrying a gun, as well as a plastic grocery sack containing
money (T. at 121-122).

Nonetheless, at his direction, she drove

away (T. at 123). Testimony at trial, contrary to defendant's
assertion, showed that Kogen "ran" to the car parked twenty to
thirty yards from the bank, and the car was immediately driven
away (T. at 40-41, 49-50, 59). Furthermore, there exists no
independent evidence in the record indicating Kogen removed his
disguise prior to entering the car other than possibly
defendant's own testimony.

These circumstances again indicate

that it was defendant's intention or "conscious objective or
desire" to actively participate in the commission of the crime.
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Fourth, following the detonation of the "red-dye pack"
(when, defendant testified, she first became aware of the
robbery), several actions by defendant (as established by
eyewitness testimony) were very consistent with a person aiding
or abetting another in the commission of a crime.

After the

explosion, defendant opened three of the car doors, attempting,
along with Kogen, to remove the red dye dust (T. at 75-76, 80).
When the car was stalled, defendant did not attempt to escape,
but in fact exited "the driver's side of the car, and . . . stood
there and looked under the hood at him [Kogen] trying to figure
out what the problem was" (T. at 42-43, 59-60, 69). Upon
restarting the car, Kogen yelled to defendant "Hey, you —
Get in.

Get in the car.

hurry.

Hurry before witnesses see us,"

following which defendant entered the passenger side (T. at 6263, 76). None of the independent witnesses testified as to any
force or threats of force.

Prior to returning to Kogen's

residence, the couple stopped at a 7-Eleven convenience store
where defendant purchased a drink (T. at 125). During this time,
defendant neither fled from Kogen, nor attempted to contact
police.
The above evidence, and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, clearly established that defendant possessed the
requisite intent for commission of the crime of aggravated
robbery.

The jury was not obligated to accept as true

defendant's version of the facts, and in the present case would
have been justified in rejecting it.

The majority of evidence presented at trial tending to
exculpate defendant consisted of her own testimony.

Yet, her

testimony, as indicated above, was both inconsistent and
illogical compared with the other evidence presented.

In

addition, the jury would have been justified in rejecting her
testimony in whole or part as inherently suspect.

Defendant

admitted at trial that she had lied to police during the recorded
interview following her arrest, concerning the events surrounding
the commission of the crime and her involvement therein.
Finally, defendant sets forth the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah 1987), as being
dispositive of the present issue, but without explanation.

In

Kalisz, the Court reversed a defendant's conviction for
aggravated robbery on grounds of insufficient evidence.

The

Court noted that the only evidence linking defendant to the crime
was that defendant provided transportation to and from the scene
of the robbery.

Furthermore, the Court went on to say,

The State failed to present any evidence
that placed Kalisz at the scene of the
robbery or in the getaway car or linked him
to the crime through possession of any of the
stolen goods . . . The circumstantial
evidence connecting Kalisz to Remington and
the crime is insufficient to prove that
Kalisz was with Remington during or
immediately after the robbery and that he had
the requisite mental state for the crime with
which he was charged.
735 P.2d at 61 (emphasis added).
Contrary to Kalisz, in the present case there is no
question that defendant was with Kogen immediately prior to and
after the commission of the aggravated robbery.

-14-

Furthermore, her

intent to commit and/or aid in the commission of the crime was
clearly established by her conduct.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the jury's guilty verdict.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this M^

day of August, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

n

to.-

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Richard J. Leedy, Attorney for Defendant, 115 South 1100 East,
Suite 710, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this

/q '" day of August,

1989.
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ADDENDUM

71-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or willfully";
"knowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligsnoe or ©riminally negligent."—A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature
of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is bit conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when be is aware of the nature of
bis conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of bis conduct when he is aware that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(S) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding bis conduct or the result of bis conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that ita disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the stsndard
of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances
as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of bis conduct when
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
764J01. Bobbery.—(1) Bobbery is the unlawful and intentional
taking of personal property in the possession of another from his person,
or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means of force
or fear.
(2) Bobbery is a felony of the second degree.

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.—(1) A person commits aggravated
robbery if in the courts of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a
knife or a deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be deemed to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or
commission of a robbery.

78-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or
for oonduct of another.—Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits ths offense,
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another
parson to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally
liable aa a party for such conduct.

